Abstract-Microgrids (MGs) have emerged as an ideal platform to integrate distributed energy resources (DERs) in a distribution network. However, the intermittent nature of DERs poses a new challenge of energy balance within a MG. Trading energy among the MGs has emerged as a well-suited solution. Therefore, we have proposed a novel method for fair and stable energy sharing among MG clusters with minimum information overhead. The novelty of the proposed method lies within the seller level game and introduction of a new pricing mechanism. The concept of an aggregator is used as a mediator between the trading parties. Depending on the priority factor, each buyer MG decides its strategy for energy demand from the surplus using a noncooperative game theory-based algorithm. The interests of seller MGs are protected by allowing them to decide the amount of energy they want to share out of their total surplus. To avoid the selfish behavior of any buyer MG, an algorithm is used by the energy market operator which verifies the strategies submitted by buyer MGs before releasing set points to the generators. Apart from fairness and stability, the extensive numerical study confirms the ascendancy of the proposed method.
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C i
The number of contributions recorded by the ith buyer MG till the present interval.
D i
The load demand of the ith buyer MG in the present interval. C Total The total number of contributions recorded by EMO till the present interval. D Total Load demand of all buyer MGs in the present interval. ϑ A small positive value. h Energy height.
0278-0046 © 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE penetration of DG at distribution network level is increasing in almost all countries worldwide. The DERs basically consist of solar photovoltaic (PV) modules, small wind turbines, electricity storage, and controllable loads. The carbon emissionless operation along with free and ample availability makes these technologies more relevant and popular in modern days, especially under current energy scenario. These technologies are expected to play a significant role in the future electricity supply [1] . Since DERs are located in close vicinity of the loads, the power quality and reliability of electricity supplied by them will improve substantially [2] - [4] . The integration of DERs in the distribution network will further reduce the line losses and the need for rapid grid expansion. A MG has emerged as an ideal platform for integrating DERs in a local distribution network [3] [4]. However, controlling a large number of DERs creates a huge challenge for operating and controlling the MG safely and efficiently especially if nondispatchable DERs such as PV or wind are involved [1] . Due to the presence of nondispatchable DERs, there always exists a problem of demand-supply mismatch in a MG. One possible solution to tackle this problem is to install diesel generators or to use large-scale centralized storage devices. However, emissions due to diesel and operating costs of storage devices are much higher than DERs, therefore, it is ideal to look for an alternative smart mechanism to deal with the energy imbalance problem faced by the MGs [5] .
Several recent papers have investigated energy management in the multi-MG clusters, which include [6] - [22] and the references therein. The autonomous MGs with the independent operator can exchange energy among themselves rather than trading with the main grid. This operating scenario creates a new energy market in a distributed network with multiple MGs. Thus, there is a need to design a computational framework and control strategies for smart MGs to facilitate energy trading among them.
A. Related Work
Due to inherent characteristics such as reactivity, proactiveness, and social ability, MAS are used in power engineering applications especially in multi-MG systems [5] - [7] . The fundamental concepts and approaches related to the multiagent systems that are appropriate to power engineering applications are discussed in [23] along with a comprehensive review of the applications for which MAS are being investigated. The guidance and recommendations on how MAS can be designed and implemented is given in [24] . Nunna and Doolla [6] used an MAS-based two-level architecture for DERs management in intelligent MGs. In the proposed mechanism, buyers and sellers are matched using a naïve auction algorithm. This mechanism works only if there is an equal number of buyer and seller MGs present in the market. Another drawback is that it requires a centralized auctioneer. Logenthiran et al. in [7] proposed a three-stage algorithm which assumes that each MG and lumped load has market price forecasting capability and they bid at their forecasted market prices. However, an accurately forecasted market price is required for each player to ensure success in the energy market.
Several game theoretical strategies were also proposed in [8] - [22] for energy management in a network of multiple MGs. Each MG needs to decide its local strategy on how to maintain local supply/demand balance as well as market strategy on how to interact with the neighboring MGs. Under such circumstances, game theory was found suitable to model and design strategies for energy trading among smart MGs [5] . A cooperative power dispatching in interconnected MGs is presented in [8] by Fathi and Bevrani and incorporated impact of demand uncertainty in [9] . In [8] and [9] authors considered that the MGs are controlled by a centralized operator which may not always be the case. The MGs can operate as autonomous entities as well. The study in [10] has considered a hierarchical structure for interactions between the main grid and the cluster of MGs. The direct energy trading among MGs is explored in [11] and [12] . Matamoros et al. [11] proposed an energy trading mechanism for islanded MGs and Gregoratti and Matamoros [12] have proposed a distributed convex optimization framework for energy trading between islanded MGs without giving any due consideration to the self-interests of multiple MGs.
In recent work, Wang and Huang [13] suggested an incentive mechanism using Nash bargaining theory to encourage proactive energy trading and fair benefit sharing among MGs. Saad et al. used the coalitional game theory in [14] for energy scheduling among multiple MGs with the goal of minimizing average power loss in the distribution network. However, this mechanism suffers from the problem of large communication overhead. Also, the issues of fairness as well as proactive participation of MGs are not addressed. Leader-follower strategies for energy management of multi-MGs are proposed in [15] - [17] . Tushar et al. [15] suggested a noncooperative Stackelberg game between the residential units and the shared facility controller in order to explore how both entities can benefit from their energy trading with each other and the grid. Asimakopoulou et al. [16] and Lee et al. [17] have presented interactions between the main grid and MGs in hierarchical order. However, in [17] , since all buyers are bidding the same value at NE, proactive participation especially from buyer MGs is not ensured. This is because the excess energy is distributed among the buyer MGs proportional to their bid placed.
Park et al. [18] have designed a contribution-based energytrading mechanism among MGs in a competitive market. However, calculation of contribution factor is not defined. This is a nonpricing-based approach. This work is extended in [19] by suggesting a priority index for buyer MGs based on past contributions and local load demand. Park et al. in [18] and Jadhav and Patne in [19] have designed strategies only for buyer MGs without giving any due consideration to the interests of seller MGs. Also, noninclusion of pricing makes these studies practically less attractive. For real-time implementation of any trading mechanism, a suitable pricing needs to be incorporated. A brief comparison of various game theory-based energy trading methods reported in the literature and close to our proposed work is presented in Table I . 
B. Our Contribution
This paper presents a novel approach to overcome the shortcomings of the existing work reported in [17] - [19] . In the proposed method, we have designed a seller level game to protect the interests of seller MGs. We have also introduced a simple pricing mechanism to avoid complex bidding algorithms. This makes the proposed method practically more relevant. It is clear from Table I that the proposed method overcomes the limitations of previously reported work and qualifies in all aspects considered.
Unlike most reported work, the computational framework designed for energy management in a multi-MG system should consider the priority of its members while sharing energy. The self-interests of individual MGs should be protected and fairness must be ensured as each MG is a rational player. In order to sustain energy trading, an efficient incentive mechanism must be in place to encourage proactive energy trading among MGs rather than trading with the main grid. Keeping all this in mind, we have designed strategies for both buyer and seller MGs. The suggested novel pricing mechanism also reduces the burden of large communication overhead.
The MGs with deficiency of energy register themselves as buyers at BAA. BAA is an aggregator working on behalf of the cluster of buyer MGs. Based on energy requirements of buyers, grid buying, and grid selling prices, the BAA decides the optimal bid value for energy purchase from the neighborhood cluster of seller MGs. Looking at the bid placed by BAA, MGs with surplus energy chooses its strategy, i.e., adjusts its own energy consumption and makes remaining energy available for sell. SAA will then aggregate this available energy for sell and informs the BAA. BAA forwards this information to all buyer MGs. Based on the priority factor, each buyer MG calculates its strategy for buying energy from available surplus and submits it to EMO. The EMO will then verify the strategy submitted and will allocate the same amount of energy to the buyer MGs who follows NE and it is proportional to their priority factor. This mechanism ensures stable operation of the proposed system and protects interests of both the seller as well as buyer MGs.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as follows.
1) Inclusion of strategies for seller and buyer MGs:
Unlike the reported work in the literature as shown in Table I , we have designed strategies for both seller as well as buyer MGs keeping in mind their individual interests to trade energy among themselves rather than trading with the main grid. A priority factor is being calculated for each buyer MG which helps in prioritizing the buyers while sharing excess energy from neighboring seller MGs.
2) Protection of seller interests: In a seller level game, seller
MGs are allowed to decide their strategy regarding the amount of energy they want to trade out of total surplus after adjusting their own energy consumptions. This in turn depends on the bid placed by BAA and the preference parameter of each seller MG. 3) Simple pricing mechanism: Unlike the complex bidding algorithms used in the literature [6] , [7] , we have used a simple pricing mechanism which makes the overall system operation simple and reduces communication overhead to a great extent. This also results in improved utility of both seller and buyer MGs. 4) Numerical analysis and discussion: The extensive numerical analysis highlights the practical applicability and advantages of the proposed method. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The details related to the multi-MG cluster model are presented in Section II. Various strategies for energy trading for both seller as well as buyer MGs, along with roles played by BAA and EMO, are summarized in Section III. Numerical results and discussion are given in Section IV. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section V.
II. MULTI-MG CLUSTER MODEL
Consider a smart distributed network of multiple MGs with various intelligent agents as shown in Fig. 1 . All the MGs are interconnected and can exchange energy among themselves and with the main grid through dedicated power exchange lines. The necessary communication infrastructure is assumed to be present as given in [25] and [26] . Let us assume that there are N MGs in a distributed network and they belong to the set N . Each n ∈ N is equipped with DERs such as wind, solar PV, etc. Each MG i ∈ N can generate energy G i during certain fixed time interval of the day. Each MG is required to fulfill essential load demand of its consumers L
for some MG i ∈ N , this ith MG is considered as seller and P is a set of all such seller MGs, i.e.,
, this ith MG needs to buy extra energy either from seller MGs or the main grid. This MG is termed as a buyer. Let Q be the index set of all such buyer MGs, i.e.,
}. The energy requirement of the ith buyer MG is given as follows:
(1) and the total energy requirement of all buyer MGs is as follows:
After serving its own essential loads, seller MG i will have excess energy for sell given as follows:
and the total excess energy available from all seller MGs before adjusting their load consumption is as follows:
We assume that each seller MG i ∈ P wants to manage its energy consumption
so that it can sell remainder of its generated energy (G i − L i ) to the buyer MGs or to the main grid using the proposed energy trading mechanism.
The excess energy available from the ith seller MG after adjusting its load consumption is given as follows: 
Rearrange the optimal strategy of each buyer MG in original order. and the total excess energy available from all seller MGs after upgrading their individual load demand to L i is as follows:
Here, we have considered G bp and G sp as grid buying and grid selling prices, respectively. We assume that the unit cost of energy that BAA pays to each seller MG is set between G bp and G sp . Thus, it is clear that each seller MG is more interested in selling excess energy E * ex,i ∀i ∈ P to neighboring buyer MGs rather than trading with the main grid. For each buyer MG, we will calculate its priority factor based on its historical contribution as well as local load demand. γ i denotes the priority factor of the ith buyer MG. In order to highlight the importance of the priority factor, a weight factor μ is used.
A typical energy trading scenario, in which a set Q of buyer MGs requests energy from the set P of neighboring seller MGs via BAA is shown in Fig. 1 . The BAA gathers the total energy demand from all the buyer MGs, i.e., E req . The BAA then decides the per unit cost of energy ρ in order to buy required energy from seller MGs s.t. G bp ≤ ρ ≤ G sp . Looking at the price placed by BAA, each seller MG then adjusts its optimal energy consumption L i , and makes remaining energy E * ex,i ∀i ∈ P available for sell and informs the EMO and BAA via SAA. The BAA then passes this information to all buyer MGs. Depending on the total excess energy available for sell E * extra and individual priority factor, each buyer MG then decides its strategy d i to request certain fraction of excess energy from EMO using 
); End Rearrange the allocated energy EA in original order and distribute among buyer MGs.
Algorithm 1 which uses noncooperative game among buyer MGs. BAA then conveys this information to the EMO. After receiving strategies from all buyer MGs regarding energy demand, EMO uses Algorithm 2 to allocate an appropriate amount of energy EA i to individual buyer MGs based on the excess energy, demand and priority factor of buyer MGs. Therefore, the energy trading mechanism depicted in Fig. 1 
A. Utility of Seller MGs
The total utility achieved by each seller MG i ∈ P from its own energy consumption L i and from selling excess energy E * ex,i to neighboring buyer MGs is given by the following:
In the literature, the natural logarithm has been used extensively to measure user's satisfaction with decreasing returns [15] , [18] . In (7), the first part represents the utility that each seller MG achieves from its own energy consumption L i , where z i is a preference parameter [15] . The seller MGs with higher value of z i are more interested in consuming energy to serve L i as compared to the seller MGs with lower value of z i . The second part of (7) gives the revenue that seller MGs can earn by trading excess energy with neighboring buyer MGs.
Since BAA has no generation capacity, it needs to buy the entire energy demand of all buyer MGs either from the seller MGs or the main grid. In most of the cases, the main grid sells energy at a higher rate compared to that from the MGs equipped with DERs such as feed-in tariff schemes [15] . Thus, BAA is more interested in buying energy on behalf of the entire buyer MGs from neighboring cluster of seller MGs at rate ρ and remaining, if any from the main grid. The careful selection of ρ is important. The too small value of ρ, i.e., ρ ≤ G bp will encourage seller MGs to utilize excess energy for its own use rather than trading with the neighbors. At the same time, too high value of ρ, i.e., ρ ≥ G sp will cost buyers significantly. In case, if the energy from the seller MGs is not sufficient to fulfill energy demand of buyer MGs, BAA will buy the remaining energy from the main grid at G sp .
The total cost incurred to the BAA for buying energy on behalf of all buyer MGs is given as follows:
In (8), the first part shows the total cost while buying energy from neighboring seller MGs and the second part indicates the cost incurred while buying remaining energy from the main grid. The second part also shows that the BAA does not buy more than required energy and energy balance holds good at all time.
B. Utility of Buyer MGs
While deciding the utility of the buyer MG U i∈Q , we assume that U i∈Q is always a nonnegative real-valued function. The energy requirement of each buyer MG is different; however, each buyer wants to receive as much energy as possible from EMO, limited to the required energy of buyer MG. Thus, the utility of buyer MG i is defined in terms of the energy allocated (EA i ) by EMO. The utility of buyer MGs must be a strictly increasing function of
, i.e., satisfaction increases by the ratio between the energy allocated and energy demand [18] . Also U i∈Q must be a concave function of EA i because the increasing rate of satisfaction decreases as the energy allocated increases. Finally, the energy allocation should also be directly proportional to the priority factor and depends on the weight factor of the priority. Thus, the utility function of the buyer MG is defined as follows:
where d i is the strategy of the ith buyer MG.
III. STRATEGIES FOR ENERGY TRADING
In this section, we will discuss the strategies adopted by BAA, EMO, and seller and buyer MGs in order to maximize their utilities. The aim of each seller MG is to adjust its own energy consumption to maximize its utility in (7) by looking at the price placed by the BAA. The goal of the BAA is to minimize per unit cost of energy while purchasing energy from seller MGs. At the same time, each buyer MG wants to acquire as much energy as possible to fulfill its local load demand. The roles played by BAA and EMO are also discussed in detail.
A. Buyer Strategies
In order to sustain energy trading among neighborhood MGs, there must exist some incentive mechanism for the participating MGs which will encourage local energy trading. Thus, we have used the priority factor [19] to prioritize buyer MGs while distributing excess energy.
1) Calculation of Priority Factor:
For each buyer MG, we will calculate its priority factor γ i ∀i ∈ Q using the following equation:
In (10), C i represents the number of contributions recorded by a buyer MG till present interval, C Total is the total number of contributions recorded by EMO till current interval, D i gives the load demand from buyer MG i, and D Total represents load demand of all buyer MGs in the current interval. The first part in (10) measures the contributions made by MG in the past by selling its excess energy to neighboring MGs and second part quantifies the load demand in each buyer MG. Since equal importance is given to both past contributions made as well as local load demand, MGs get encouraged to trade energy among themselves rather than trading with the main grid. We have also used a weight factor μ (μ > 0) which indicates the importance of priority factor during energy trading. It is dynamic in nature and set by EMO. However, in this study, we set value of μ as 1.5 for all buyer MGs.
2) Noncooperative Game Among Buyer MGs: Each buyer MG is a rational player and having different energy demands. Also, each one is trying to acquire as much energy as possible from the local energy market via EMO. Thus, the utility functions of all buyer MGs are given as follows: In order to show the existence of the NE in buyer level game, we need to show the continuity and quasi-concavity of the utility function [30] . As the objective function is continuous and the strategic domain is convex, it is clear that the utility function u i (d 1 , d 2 . . . ., d Q ) is continuous in (d 1 , d 2 . . . ., d Q ) . 
If any one of the utilities
is zero, then the proof is done. Therefore, now we will consider a nontrivial case when both of them are nonzero.
In this case u i (d i ,d −i ) = 0 and therefore the inequality holds.
In this case, it can be proved that 
The case that remains to be proved is when
* is a unique NE solution in the proposed buyer MG level game [18] .
Proof: Let us suppose there exists another NE,
, which also contradicts with the assumption made, i.e., d is an NE.
Thus, there exists only a unique NE in the proposed noncooperative game among buyer MGs. Algorithm 1 gives the NE solution, i.e., the optimal strategy for each buyer MG.
3) Role of BAA: The BAA is acting as the representative of all buyer MGs. The main function of BAA is to decide per unit cost of energy, ρ in order to buy required energy E req = i∈Q E req,i from seller MGs s.t. G bp ≤ ρ ≤ G sp . The BAA has no control over G bp and G sp , thus it has to adjust its own buying price ρ to minimize (8) . The objective of the BAA is given as follows:
Now, using the first-order optimality condition of BAA's objective function in (8), we have the following:
Solving (13), we obtain the following:
where ϑ > 0 is a small value to keep ρ more than G bp .
B. Seller Strategies
We have assumed that seller MGs do not have any storage capacity therefore each seller MG is interested in selling its excess energy E * ex,i = (G i − L i ) ∀i ∈ P at suitable price ρ to the BAA after adjusting its own energy consumption L i . Thus, the objective of each seller MG is as follows:
From (7) and (15), the first-order differential condition for maximum utility can be derived as follows:
Solving (16) further gives the following:
From (17), we can observe that the decision-making process of each seller MG is influenced by the price set by BAA. Care should be taken such that z i is sufficiently large so that (17) always possesses a positive value for all resulting values of L i . Also, L i should be at least as large as its minimum essential load. From (17) it is also clear that the energy consumption L i of each seller MG is inversely proportional to the price per unit of energy set by BAA. Hence, higher value of ρ encourages seller MGs to sell more energy by reducing its own energy consumption and vice-versa.
C. Role of EMO
The main function of EMO is to distribute excess energy available from seller MGs among buyer MGs. The EMO wants to maximize the social welfare (SW) i.e., the sum of the satisfaction of all buyer MGs. Let U i (EA i ) is the satisfaction of buyer i from EMO's view. i∈Q U i (EA i ) is the SW of the system. Now the optimization problem to allocate energy to the buyer MGs is given as follows:
By using [18, Theorem 1], the optimal energy allocation EA * = {EA * i | i ∈ Q} is given as follows:
The above problem is the different version of water filling problem in [29] . Algorithm 2 gives the optimal solution of the above problem using the modified water filling algorithm given in [18] .
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
For numerical case study purpose, we have considered a distributed network of six interconnected MGs. The 24 h of a day are divided into 96 blocks of 15 min each. However, EMO is supposed to decide this time interval depending on the operating circumstances. The selection of short duration is normally preferred as the amount of energy available for sell is directly proportional to the trading interval. During this fixed time interval, we assume that demand and supply are constant. The first 5 min are designated as discussion period for interagent communications for negotiating energy trading for next interval. The result of these negotiations is a set of mutual contracts which will be implemented in the next trading interval. The system data used for first four time blocks are given in Table II . The values of G bp and G sp are set as 0.8 USA and 2.4 USA cents/kWh, respectively [17] . The value of μ is fixed at 1.5. For this study, preference parameter z i is selected as a random variable from the range [120, 150].
In block 1, MGs 1, 2, and 6 have generated energy more than their minimum loads requirements, whereas MGs 3, 4, and 5 have generated energy less than their minimum load. Therefore, MGs 3, 4, and 5 register themselves as buyers at BAA and forms a cluster of buyer MGs, whereas MGs 1, 2, and 6 register themselves as sellers at SAA and forms a cluster of seller MGs. The BAA has the information regarding buyer energy requirements, seller generations, and their preference parameters. Based on this information, BAA calculates bid value on behalf of all the buyers using (14) which is 1.90 cents/kWh In order to sustain energy trading, EMO calculates priority factor for each buyer MG. Based on the priority factor, each buyer decides its optimal strategy to buy energy from the surplus. During the first interval, no past contributions are recorded, hence only the second part of (10) dominates. During this interval, MG with more load demand will get more priority. It can be observed that MG 4 having highest load demand of 50 kW gets higher priority, i.e., 0.5 and MG 5 is having lowest load demand gets lower priority of 0.2. Based on total energy remaining for sell and priority factor, each buyer calculates its optimal strategy for buying energy from the surplus. In block 1, MGs 3, 4, and 5 calculate their optimal strategies as 15.46, 33.27, and 8.42 kW, respectively, using Algorithm 1. Once the strategies are calculated by individual buyer MG, it will be forwarded to the EMO via BAA. After receiving the optimal strategies from individual buyer MG, EMO uses Algorithm 2 to allocate energy to the buyer MGs proportional to their priority factor. Since MG 4 is having highest priority during first interval, it gets the highest allocation of energy from the EMO as 33.27 kW. MG 5 is assigned with lower priority factor and gets lowest energy share of 8.42 kW.
In block 1, seller MG 6 has the highest preference parameter as 145, which in turn indicates its inclination toward more self-energy consumption rather than trading with the neighboring MGs. MG 6 has a minimum load of 70 kW which it adjusts to 75.32 kW after receiving a bid value of 1.90 cents/ kWh from the BAA. Similarly, MG 1 and MG 2 have preference parameters 140 and 125 which in turn adjust their energy consumptions to 72.74 and 64.79 kW from earlier 70 and 50 kW, respectively. In block 1, total energy demand is 100 kW. However, total available excess energy from neighboring seller MGs is only 57.15 kW. Thus, BAA requests EMO to buy remaining 42.85 kW of energy from the main grid at G sp rate.
The overall energy trading scenario during first four blocks of the time interval is depicted in Table III . In block 2, MG 2 and 3 are acting as sellers whereas MG 1, 4, 5, and 6 are acting as buyers. Since MG 1 has acted as seller and contributed its excess energy in the past interval, i.e., in block 1, this MG will receive more importance in the second interval in terms of priority during energy allocation. It is clear that MG 1 receives 32.47 kW of energy which is higher than the rest of the buyer MGs. Thus, the proposed mechanism encourages the MGs to share excess energy among themselves rather than trading with the main grid.
In block 3, we have two seller MGs and three buyer MGs. Since generation and load are equal in MG 5, this MG remains energy neutral. In block 4, there are four seller MGs whereas buyers are only two. Also, excess energy for selling is around 121.87 kW which is far more than the buyer's demand of 80 kW. Thus, after fulfilling local MGs demand, excess energy of 41.87 kW will be sold to the main gird at rate G bp . As the trading goes on, EMO continues to record the contributions made by individual MG which helps it in calculating their priority factors in future. The number of MGs versus average convergence time for Algorithms 1 and 2 is depicted in Figs. 2 and 3 , respectively, as the number of participating MGs varies from 4 to 100. However, in most of the practical cases, the number of MGs participating in energy trading will be well below 50. All simulations are performed on 2.53 GHz Intel core i3 processor. The average convergence time is a linearly increasing function of number of participating MGs. In a case of minimum four participating MGs, the average convergence time for Algorithms 1 and 2 is 2.1 and 2.4 ms, respectively. Also, in extreme case of 100 participating MGs, the average convergence time turns out to be only 0.2 and 0.65 s, respectively. This justifies the selection of 5 min as discussion period at the beginning of the trading interval. Fig. 4 illustrates the effect of the variation of the weight factor μ on the energy allocated to the buyer MGs in interval 2. When the weight factor is zero, the equal amount of energy is allocated to each buyer MG, in this case, 23.19 kW. This is because when μ = 0, EMO does not consider the importance of the priority. As we go on increasing the value μ, the energy allocation gap also goes on increasing until the buyer with the higher priority gets saturated to its maximum.
In order to highlight the benefits of the proposed mechanism, the results are also compared with the multileader multifollower (MLMF)-based distributed mechanism suggested in [17] as simulation setup is close to the proposed method. The optimal bid placed by BAA during various trading intervals is shown in Fig. 5 . It is interesting to note that in both methods, optimal bids are within the limits i.e., G bp ≤ ρ ≤ G sp . In MLMF method [17] optimal bid monotonically increases with the number of buyer MGs. In worst case of two buyer MGs, i.e., in block 4, the optimal bid for [17] turns out to be only 0.8/kWh which is equal to the grid buying price. In almost all blocks, the bid placed by BAA using the proposed method is higher than the MLMF method. This in turn encourages seller MGs to share more portion of their excess energy with the buyers and also increases the utility of seller MGs.
Figs. 6-9 show the energy allocation to the buyer MGs during various trading intervals. In the MLMF [17] method, each buyer receives the equal share of the excess energy. Thus, there is no distinction among the buyer MGs. Also, irrespective of the load demand, each buyer MG receives the equal share of the excess energy. Contrast to this, in the proposed mechanism, the energy is allocated to individual buyer MG proportional to its priority factor which in turn depends on its local load demand and past contributions recorded and limited to its maximum demand. Thus, unlike the method in [17] , the proposed method ensures proactive energy sharing among local MG clusters.
The excess energy available for trade during various trading intervals is shown Fig. 10 . Unlike the reported work [17] - [19] , we have paid attention to the seller strategies as well. As a result, sellers are allowed to use some portion of the excess energy for running their own elastic loads. Therefore, even after using some portion of excess energy for running elastic load, the remaining energy available for trade is close to the results obtained using the MLMF method [17] . The total cost incurred to BAA, i.e., C BAA while fulfilling buyers demand during various trading intervals is depicted in Fig. 11 . As the bid placed by BAA using [17] is less than the proposed method, the C BAA is more for the proposed method. However, it is less than the baseline approach. Higher value of C BAA encourages seller MGs to trade larger portion of their excess energy in local market. The total revenue earned by seller MGs during various trading intervals is shown in Fig. 12 . As the bid place by BAA using the proposed method is higher than the MLMF [17] and grid buying price, a substantial improvement in the revenue earned by the seller MG is observed. Thus, the proposed method protects the interests of seller MGs as well. Also, seller MGs are allowed to run their own elastic loads.
It is interesting to note that in Table III , each buyer MG follows the NE strategy. Hence, the strategy submitted by each buyer MG and energy allocated by EMO are always equal as shown in Table III . However, if there exists any selfish player who submits other than Nash equilibrium solution as strategy, EMO ensures fair energy allocation to each buyer MG that follows NE solution based on its priority factor. Thus, selfish behavior of any buyer MG gets eliminated and the system remains stable. This ensures that interests of all buyer MGs are also protected.
V. CONCLUSION
In the proposed method, interests of both the seller as well as the buyer MGs are protected by allowing them to decide their own strategies to maximize their respective utilities. In order to promote local energy trading, incentives are given to the seller MGs in terms of priority in future when they need energy from the local market. The seller MGs are also allowed to decide the amount of energy they want to share out of their total surplus. The competition among buyer MGs is formulated as a noncooperative game. The existence and uniqueness of NE are also shown. Using the proposed method, selfish behavior of any buyer MG gets eliminated. Introduction of simple pricing mechanism bypasses the use of complex bidding algorithms. The extensive numerical study quantifies the benefits of the proposed method as compared to the baseline and MLMF [17] method. Moreover, the distributed decision-making capability of an individual entity in the proposed framework has further reduced the communication overhead to a great extent.
The future work could focus on studying the effect of distributed storage and seasonal weather variation on the performance of the multi-MG distribution network managed using the proposed mechanism.
